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Two main challenges influence the design of regional policies carried out by European, 
National and Regional policy makers. The first is the shift towards a knowledge-based 
economy, where enterprise competitiveness is increasingly linked to intangible assets. 
The second is the enlargement of the European Union that means important changes in 
the European Union marketplace and the possibilities of intervention in some less 
favoured regions. Until today, Regional Policy in many European Union countries has 
principally been founded on incentives for the creation of employment and investment 
in tangible assets. 
In this context, Spanish Regional Policy has been formulated, on the one hand, to 
achieve decentralisation of the entities responsible for its promotion and, on the other, 
to foster co-ordination and integration of Community, National and Autonomous 
Region interventions. Moreover, the design of this policy has taken into consideration 
the classical conflict between equity and efficiency.  
The objective of this paper is to assess the results and the gradual changes in regional 
incentive policy applied in Spain over the last 15 years and to identify the elements in 
which public intervention could be improved in order to adapt this policy to the 
demands laid out within the new environment previously defined. This assessment 
includes: firstly, a brief analysis of the evolution of public intervention; secondly, a 
study of the spatial distribution of the incentives over the period considered; and thirdly, 
a comparison of the economic performance of the different areas depending on the 
awards received. 
The analysis of this policy is based on a database comprising over 16 000 items 
referring to award decisions to applications for Regional Investment Grants (Law 
50/1985 of 22 December 1985) gathered from the Official State Bulletin (Boletín 
Oficial del Estado, BOE) during the period 1988-2003. 
 
KEY WORDS: Spain, Regional policy, Regional incentive, Employment, Investment, 
Policy assessment 
   2
1. INTRODUCTION 
The common internal market, based on the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital, is one of the essential cornerstones of the European Union. The Treaty 
establishing the European Community (the EC Treaty) includes "a system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted" and seeks "the approximation of the 
laws of Member States to the extent required for the functioning of the common 
market". Following this approach, the EC Treaty stipulates that aid granted by the 
Member States is incompatible with the common market because such aid distorts 
competition by favouring certain firms or the production of certain goods.  
At the same time, another cornerstone of the Community is economic and social 
cohesion. It aims to reduce disparities between the levels of development of the richer 
and poorer regions in Europe. That is why certain kinds of grants are compatible with 
the common market. The exceptions to the rule focus on: 
•  Aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment, and;  
•  Aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an 
extent contrary to the common interest.  
These two exceptions directly concern regional aid. In that sense, guidelines on national 
regional aid establish that regional aid is oriented to specific geographical areas and 
aims specifically at encouraging the economic development of those areas by providing 
support for investment and job creation.  
Although enlargement, modernisation and diversification of the activities of firms 
located in these regions is allowed, as well as the establishment of new firms, several 
aspects question the effectiveness of this instrument. 
Firstly, the increasing flexibility of business location fosters regional competence. 
Regions compete to attract investment offering a wide range of incentives and benefits. 
This opens a debate as to the relevance of regional aid, among other factors, as relevant 
variables for business location decision-making. Along these lines, Thomsen and 
Woolcock (1993) point out that incentives do not represent a determining factor in   3
business location decision-making since they do not outweigh unstable macroeconomic 
policies or the lack of skilled labour. 
Secondly, although the fundamental objective of incentive policies is to attract 
investment towards less developed areas, aid will only be able to go where some 
business activity is already established. In this respect, as Ogando and Rodríguez, 
(1992) have highlighted, those underdeveloped areas with a consolidated industrial base 
that are relatively better-off, have been able to take advantage of this instrument. 
Along the same line, Argüelles (1997) argues that subjective factors, in the form of 
subsidies, are more important as location factors than incentives. Together with 
subjective factors, the industrial tradition of the area in a particular activity or the 
existence of external economies is emphasised. 
Thus, although regional incentives exert a certain influence on business location, they 
are just one of the variables that can be used by policymakers and their effects should 
not be overestimated (Martín, 1998). Nevertheless, caution must be exercised in the use 
of regional incentive policy since any positive effect in the well being of one 
municipality or region might be obtained at the expense of another. Steps must be taken 
to ensure that regional aid does not become a zero-sum game. Public policy might prove 
a waste of resources should the gains obtained by some local firms have a negative 
repercussion on the activity of others or should incentives be misdirected and not 
concur with the real necessities of local companies (Chesire and Gordon, 1998). 
In this context, the objective of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of regional 
incentive policy applied in Spain during the period 1988-2001 at a municipal scale. 
Specifically, the relation between economic growth and the amount of incentives 
received by each Spanish municipality is analysed, taking into consideration the 
characteristics of the subsidised projects and the municipalities concerned. One of the 
main problems faced was the lack of economic information at a local scale. Therefore, it 
was necessary to create an indicator of the municipal economic situation that could 
provide a comparison of the economic level of each municipality between 1991 and 
2001.   4
2. THE DESIGN OF REGIONAL INVESTMENT GRANT POLICY IN SPAIN 
Regional investment grant policy in Spain has its legal basis in Law 50/1985 of 27 
December 1985 on regional incentives for the correction of territorial and economic 
disparities, Royal Decree of 11 December 1987, and the Royal Decrees of Delimitation 
for each designated area. 
Regional incentive is understood by this law as any financial aid that the State grants to 
encourage business activity and to steer its location towards a previously determined 
area in order to reduce economic disparities in the national territory, to obtain a more 
equitable distribution of economic activity and to reinforce the use of indigenous 
resources of regions. 
A typology of assisted areas has been defined: 
•  Zones of Economic Promotion  (Zonas de Promoción Económica,  ZPE), 
comprising the less developed regions, defined by their unemployment rate, 
income per capita and other representative criteria of regional problems. Within 
this group, there are preferential areas (Zona prioritaria) depending on their 
population, industrial space availability and available infrastructure. 
•  Zones in Industrial Decline (Zonas Industrializadas en Declive, ZID) that are 
established in areas affected by important processes of industrial adjustment with 
repercussions in the economic activity and employment of a specific branch of 
industry in this area. 
•  Special Zones (Zona Especial, ZE) that are created by Government if justified 
due to special circumstances. 
Territories are classified into four types of zones (I, II, III and IV), in agreement with 
their level of development, based on income per capita and unemployment rate. Award 
rate cannot surpass 50%, 40%, 30% and 20% of investment
1, respectively. ZPE can 
only be created in zones I, II and III, although only projects located in the preferential 
areas of the ZPE can be awarded the maximum rate in their categories. In this context, 
the ZID and the ZE can receive percentages above those indicated for their zone. In 
                                            
1   The calculation of the award rate (net grant-equivalent) includes, in addition to the aid obtained 
through Law 50 of regional incentives, all other financial aid whatever its nature or source. The 
calculation of the net grant-equivalent is made according to the procedure decided with the 
Commission of the European Communities.   5
exceptional cases, increases in the maximum award rate can even be authorised in zones 
I and II. 
The regional incentive grant scheme promotes a high degree of decentralisation as 
Autonomous Communities play a relevant role, their competences including the 
following: Promotion of regional incentives within their territory; Collaboration with 
the General Board
2 ( Consejo Rector) in drawing up proposals for the geographic 
delimitation of the preferential zones under their area of influence; To communicate to 
the General Board priorities with regard to the determination of eligible activities; To 
form part of the working party charged with drawing up, by delegation, proposals for 
concession of regional incentives; Declaration of the fulfilment of conditions and 
proposal for filing a disciplinary report; Accomplishment of the ordinary pursuit of the 
granted projects and control over delegated European Union policies; Drawing up a six-
monthly report of the development of its projects. 
Despite decentralisation, responsibility for award decisions involving investments of 
over €6.01 million lies with the Government Delegation for Financial Affairs (Delegada 
del Gobierno para Asuntos Económicos)
3.  Decisions are taken based on 
recommendations from the General Board with regard to awards of over €6.01 million 
and from a working party (grupo de trabajo)
4 in the case of awards of less than €6.01 
million. For projects involving investments of less than €450.8 thousand, the 
Autonomous Community makes the proposal within each working party. 
During 1988 and 1989 initial outlining of the eligible zones was implemented. This 
scheme covered 6,030 municipalities, 95.6% of which were located in the ZPE zones. 
Ten Autonomous Communities (Asturias, Baleares, Canarias, Cantabria, Ceuta and 
                                            
2   The General Board is chaired by the Secretary of State for Budget and Expenditure and belongs to the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance. In addition to making award proposals for large projects, this 
General Board is also responsible for setting the guidelines for regional incentive policy and for co-
ordinating regional and sector policies.  
3   Formally, responsibility for award decisions for projects involving investments of less than € 6.01 
million lies with the Minister of Economy and Finance (Ministro de Economía y Hacienda). In 
practice, however, this responsibility is delegated to the Secretary of State for Budget and 
Expenditure (Secretario de Estado de Presupuestos y Gastos). 
4   The working party of each Autonomous Community containing assisted comprises the chairman (the 
assistant director general for regional incentive policy), three representatives from central government 
administration and three from the Autonomous Community. Central government representatives are 
from the different ministries involved. 
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Melilla, Galicia, Castilla y León, Castilla – La Mancha, Extremadura, Murcia) were 
covered in full; three were partially covered (Aragón, Comunidad Valenciana and País 
Vasco (The Basque Country)). Four regions were excluded from this scheme (Madrid, 
Cataluña, La Rioja and Navarra). In terms of population, 60% of the Spanish population 
lived in these eligible areas and 86.1% of the population of affected Autonomous 
Communities was covered (in the case of Aragón, Comunidad Valenciana and País 
Vasco the covered population was 90.7%, 31.4% and 51.5%, respectively).  
This situation was the starting point for the successive modifications that altered the 
map of eligible zones throughout the 1990s. The nationally designated areas in Spain 
are at present the result of 44 Royal Decrees that, over 15 years of application, have 
outlined, modified and extended the different zones and their award rates. 
However, these modifications have only led to minor changes in the denomination of 
certain areas. In fact, at the end of this adjustment process, the total number of eligible 
municipalities had only diminished by 25
5, the total number of eligible municipalities 
during this period being 6,296. Considering these changes, in 2001, 61.6% of the 
national population was covered by the regional investment grant scheme. 
To sum up, taking into account the typology of assisted areas and the maximum award 
rate during the life of Law 50, up to 18 different territorial categories (Table 1) may be 
identified, although some have enjoyed a brief life span. In any case, the wide range of 
maximum award rates, the initial definition of zones and its subsequent modification, as 
well as the possible exceptions, lead to a high degree of confusion and complexity in the 
practical instrumentation of the Law. 
Table 1. Territorial categories of the regional incentives between 1988 and 2001 
Maximum award (%)  Types of zones 
20 25 30 40 45 50 75 
Special zone (ZE)  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Zone in industrial decline (ZID)  X  X  X  X  X 
Non-preferential Zone of economic promotion (ZPE)      X  X  X  X  
Preferential Zone of economic promotion (ZPE)     X  X  X  
Source: own source. 
 
                                            
5   The changes have been: All the territory belonging to País Vasco (Basque Country) has lost its right 
to incentives, the number of eligible municipalities of Aragón was reduced, the eligible territory in the 
Comunidad Valenciana was enlarged. In addition, all remaining ZID disappeared to become ZPE.   7
The existence of different zones, with different circumstances and problems, was 
reflected in the establishment of different objectives, although not in the eligible 
activities, the eligible project types or the eligible expenditures. The objectives 
considered in all Royal Decrees of zone delimitation of all the Autonomous 
Communities are recurrent, although a clear difference can be appreciated between 
those proposed in the ZID and the ZPE (Table 2). 





















































































































































































































































































To correct the economic and social 
disparities caused by industrial decline             X  X  X  X X
To offset the negative effects of industrial 
adjustment             X  X  X  X X
Suitable development of industrial 
infrastructure, respecting the environment             X  X  X  X X
To correct economic and social disparities in 
terms of income and unemployment  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X     
To promote integration between productive 
activities  X  X  X X  X X  X  X  X  X     
To foster potential endogenous development  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X     
To enable economic development suitable to 
the business structure  X  X X  X  X  X  X  X   X     
Source: own source. 
The clear differences in objectives have not been accompanied by similar differences in 
eligible activities, mainly: Extractive and manufacturing industries, especially those that 
apply leading edge high-technologies or use alternative energy; Food-processing and 
fish farming activities; Tourism; Industrial services and services which improve 
commercial structure. The main difference between the ZID and the ZPE is that in the 
former, activities related with tourism and services that improve commercial structure 
are not eligible, laying greater emphasis on labour intensive services
6. In addition to this 
ill-defined delimitation of eligible activities, in exceptional cases and subsequent to a 
previous report from the General Board, the responsible bodies can grant projects that 
                                            
6    In the Canaries, the activities related with desalination facilities and water-treatment plants are 
eligible and in Ceuta and Extremadura crafts are also eligible activities. 
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are not included in the mentioned activities, but which clearly contribute to the 
achievement of a specific objective. 
 
3. THE APPLICATION OF LAW 50/1985 BETWEEN 1988 AND 2001 
In order to analyse the effects of the application of Law 50/1985, it has proved 
necessary to extract and compile all the request resolution orders of projects published 
in the Official State Bulletin (Boletín Oficial del Estado, BOE)
 7 between 1988 and the 
end of 2001. As approved projects have been used, it is necessary to bear in mind the 
delay between the time of the application, publication in the BOE and the final grant 
concession. 
Besides, a definitive grant can be totally or partially paid, there being many reasons that 
can partially reduce it or even completely cancel it. In order to overcome this problem, 
all the published resolution orders up to the end of 2003 referring to the projects 
initially approved have been compiled, as they might have expired, been discontinued, 
failed to fulfil some of the terms or been modified by the administration. 
Among the possible setbacks (Table 3), special note should be taken of the percentage 
of applications rejected (30.7%) and projects which have not been carried out, 33.6% of 
the 10,009 initially approved. Projects might have been discontinued, expired or 
seriously failed to fulfil the stipulated conditions. These setbacks have meant an 
investment reduction of €7,600 million and represented 58,584 additional employees. 
The analysis of the applications per zones (Table 4) shows the enormous project 
concentration and investment in the ZPE, which is clear given the great extension of 
territory covered by this type of zones. Moreover, what is striking is the significant 
difference between the percentage of applications rejected (21%) and failed projects 
                                            
7   The available statistical data suffers from limitations that condition the approach adopted. For 
example, in the BOE neither the specific sector to which the company belongs nor the type of 
investment is published. These gaps in information make it difficult to answer questions such as: Do 
the companies incorporate incentives in their valuations, and if so, to what degree? Why? Is there any 
firm characteristic, such as size, property or location, that lead to systematic differences in the way in 
which the firms use the incentives? Do the incentives achieve their immediate objective of inducing 
companies to make additional capital expenses? Despite this, the data would offer substantial 
potential were it to be complemented with other sources of existing data. 
   9
(those approved that have not been carried out, 27%) of the ZE projects in comparison 
with projects of other zones. 
Table 3. Effects on investment, grant and employment of projects in terms of 
categories between 1988 and 2001 
Investment Associated
1   Incentive cost
1 Employment  Associated  Setbacks  Number of 
projects  Initial Final  Initial  Final  Initial  Final 
None 5.586  20.008  20.008  2.981 2.981  103.507 103.507 
Modified 677  4.478  5.928 1.258  1.254 19.322  16.858 
Partial breach   383  1.169  1.162  157  141  6.137  5.905 
Total breach  987  2.055  0  346  0  15.069  0 
Expired 534  1.087  0  190  0  7.493  0 
Discontinued 1.842  4.459  0  770  0  36.022  0 
Total granted  10.009  33.256  27.098  5.700  4.376  187.550  126.270 
Total rejected  4.444  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Total requested  14.453  -  -  -  -  -  - 
1 Figures are in Mio € at 2001 prices. 
Source: own source. 
 
Table 4. Projects under Law 50/1985 per zones and Autonomous Communities 


































Types of zones 
ZE  1.9  21.0  27.0     5.7 2.6 2.4 
ZID    4.5  31.2  42.1     3.1 5.9 3.2 
ZPE  (No  preferential)  28.5 32.6 34.8     21.9 17.7 21.8 
ZPE  (preferential)  65.1 30.2 32.7     69.3 73.8 72.6 
Autonomous Communities 
Andalucía  26.3  36.0 36.6  5.5  2.2 21.2 20.6 22.6 
Aragón  3.2  22.4  34.9  4.3 2.2 6.0 3.2 4.5 
Asturias  4.8  33.1  22.0  6.3 3.3 8.1  11.3 4.4 
Canarias  4.9  34.9  39.1  4.7 1.9 6.7 5.9 6.6 
Cantabria  1.6  26.8  29.0  4.4 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.1 
Castilla y León  16.4  30.7  28.6 9.3  4.6  16.0 13.6 23.0 
Castilla - La Mancha  9.1  32.7 40.8  7.9  3.1  6.6 5.7 7.3 
Ceuta y Melilla  0.2  51.9  46.2 2.2  0.6  0.1 0.1 0.2 
Com.  Valenciana  7.1  26.3  22.5  8.4 4.8 9.8 5.5 8.3 
Extremadura  6.7  21.9  35.4  9.0 4.5 3.6 4.7 4.6 
Galicia  13.0  29.1 36.2  6.9  3.1  9.5 12.1 10.2 
Murcia  4.3  16.9  35.6  6.0 3.2 9.0  14.1 5.3 
País  Vasco  2.4  36.2  33.6  3.1 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 
Total   100.0  30.7  33.6  6.4  6.4  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1 Data of inhabitants from the 1991 Population and Housing Census (Censo de Población y Vivienda). 
2 Mio € at 2001 prices. 
Source: own source. 
Regardless of zones, analysis of the Autonomous Communities shows that they do not 
behave in a similar way. Andalucía, Castilla y León and Galicia account for 55.8% of 
aid requests, which means 53.7% of the granted projects, 46.7% of the subsidised 
investment and 46.4% of the amount granted. This concentration is mainly due to the 
size of their territories, although in the case of Castilla y León also to the large number 
of requests. This Community, together with Extremadura and Comunidad Valenciana,   10
are the regions with the greatest number of requests and subsidised projects carried out, 
both measured per 10,000 inhabitants. 
The analysis of the subsidised project characteristics is a previous requirement to the 
examination of the degree to which these incentives have achieved their objectives. In 
this respect, table 5 shows the existence of important differences for the considered 
characteristics both in terms of zones and Autonomous Communities. 
Table 5: Characteristics of projects under Law 50/1985 between 1988 and 2001 per 
zone and Autonomous Community 














Rate of award 
(as % of 
investment) 
Percentage 




Type of zone               
ZE 9.86  19.2  720  513  29.9  7.3  18.3 
ZID   3.24  15.6  992  208  36.0  30.6  18.4 
ZPE (No preferential)  3.28  15.2  428  215  46.7  13.1  30.9 
ZPE (preferential)  4.25  20.7  731  205  35.4  17.2  29.4 
Autonomous Community               
Andalucía 3.72  18.5  585  201  31.6  15.7  32.9 
Aragón 6.87  23.7  594  290  25.1  8.7  17.4 
Asturias 6.10  15.4  1.366  397  88.8  22.4  25.1 
Canarias 6.52  30.0  924  217  30.8  14.2  33.5 
Cantabria 5.09  22.6  746  225  33.0  14.7  20.3 
Castilla y León  3.70  24.7 507 150  20.5 13.7  29.7 
Castilla - La Mancha  3.43 17.6  474  195  27.0  13.8 32.3 
Ceuta y Melilla  3.59  38.7 717  93  18.5 19.9  30.1 
Com. Valenciana  4.56  18.1  414  252  22.9  9.1  20.6 
Extremadura 2.00  12.0  427  167  35.7  21.4  30.5 
Galicia 3.00  15.0  622  200  41.3  20.7  32.2 
Murcia 7.27  19.8  1.842  367  93.1  25.3  30.6 
País Vasco  2.10  8.5  319  248  37.7  15.2  8.2 
Total   4.08  19.0  658  215  34.7  16.1  29.1 
1 Mio € at 2001 prices. 
Source: own source. 
The project size, measured through the ratio investment per project, is significantly 
larger in the ZE than in the remaining zones. In terms of Autonomous Communities, the 
size of subsidised projects in Murcia (€7.27 million) is particularly worthy of note, 
especially, if compared with Extremadura (€2.00 million), although differences are 
explicable, partly, by the presence of certain large scale projects
8. 
The projects that arise in the preferential ZPE and the ZE generate more employment on 
average, although the investment necessary to create a job was more than twice that of 
other zones. In this respect, it must be emphasised that the preferential ZPE, in addition 
                                            
8   Two projects located in the ZPE of Murcia jointly reached nearly €1,400 million of real investment. 
In the ZE of Aragón, a project with a real investment above €420 million was carried out. Prominent 
after these is a project in the ZPE of Asturias with an investment of over €900 million and another in 
the ZPE of Castilla y León of €475 million.   11
to being the kind of zone with the most intensive labour projects, have required the least 
investment per job created. This fact, although reasonable in order to resolve one of the 
main problems of the ZPE (unemployment), has the disadvantage of creating jobs 
without sufficient capital endowment. This could lead to a bottleneck of low 
productivity in relation to the jobs created in other zones and, therefore, an overall 
viability problem in the medium and long term. 
There are also striking differences in the average employment created from a regional 
perspective, prominent amongst which are the projects located in Ceuta and Melilla and 
the Canaries compared to those in the Basque Country, Extremadura and Galicia. The 
project’s investment and employment have determined that the greatest investment 
necessary to create a job was in Asturias (€397 thousand) followed by Murcia (€367 
thousand). Both figures contrast with the €93 thousand that needed to be invested in 
Ceuta and Melilla. 
With regard to the average award rate, measured as a percentage of investment, a 
positive discrimination in favour of the ZID can be seen. The grant for this zone reaches 
30.6% whereas in ZE it is four times less (7.3%), in the non-preferential ZPE is less 
than half (13.1%), the average rate being 16% of investment. In all cases, the 
differences between the grant percentage obtained and the maximum percentage fixed 
by the different Royal Decrees of Delimitation of zones are considerable, especially in 
the ZPE. This confirms the results obtained by other researchers (Fernández et al., 1994; 
Rodríguez Alba, 1998; Moyano and Ogando, 2003) and raises questions as to the 
potential influence that incentives exercise as a business location factor. 
The disparity in the characteristics of the projects has been confirmed by means of the 
non-parametric test of Kruskall-Wallis
9. It is possible to conclude that, in all the 
variables, either by type of zones or by Autonomous Communities, one of the regions 
                                            
9   Test H of Kruskal-Wallis, or analysis of variance by ranges, takes the sum of the ranges of each 
sample as the departure point. Calling n the total set of observations and Rij the range assigned to 
observation i of sample j, H is defined as: 





















  Under the null hypothesis that the J population averages are equal, the statistical H distributes 
according to the chi-square probability model with J-1 degrees of freedom.   12
differs from the rest. In addition, to analyse in which characteristic the disparity occurs, 
the Mann-Whitney test was used, accompanied by the Bonferroni correction to control 
the rate of error. 
Table 6 shows that the project average investment and the award rate are the two 
differentiating characteristics of the four analysed zones. Both characteristics, together 
with average project employment, are also the most relevant characteristics when a 
comparison is made between Autonomous Communities (Table 7). 
Table 6: Main differences in the characteristics of projects under Law 50/1985 
between types of zones 
  ZE  ZID  ZPE (Non-preferential)  ZPE (Preferential) 
ZE  -  a, b, f  a, c, f  a, f 
ZID  -  a, f  a, b, c, e, f 
ZPE (No-preferential)  -  a, b, c, d, f 
ZPE (Preferential)  - 
(a) Investment per project (Mio € at 2001 prices); (b) Employment per project; (c) Grant per project (Mio 
€ at 2001 prices); (d) Investment per job (Mio € at 2001 prices); (e) Grant per employee (Mio € at 2001 
prices); (f) Award Rate (as a % of investment). 
Source: own source. 
Table 7: Main differences in the characteristics of the projects under Law 50/1985 
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Galicia  a, d, f  a, d ,f  a, b, 
d, f 
a, c, d, 
e, f 
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Murcia  b, f  f  b, d, f  a, b, 
d, e, f  a, f  b, d, f  b, f  No  a, b, c, 
d, e, f 
a, b, 












País Vasco  a, b, c  a, b, c, 
e, f  a, c  a, b, c  a, b, c  a, b, c  a, b, c  a, b, c  a, b, c, 
e, f  d, f  b, c, 
d, e, f 
a, b, c, 
d, f  - 
(a) Investment per project (Mio € at 2001 prices); (b) Employment per project; (c) Grant per project (Mio 
€ at 2001 prices); (d) Investment per job (Mio € at 2001 prices); (e) Grant per job (Mio € at 2001 prices); 
(f) Award Rate (as a % of investment).  
Source: own source. 
In particular, the award rate is the most frequent characteristic when comparisons are 
drawn between projects of Aragón, Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana,   13
Extremadura and Galicia and those of the remaining Autonomous Communities. In the 
Canaries, the two distinctive characteristics are the grant per job and per project. The 
subsidy per project is also a specific characteristic in Cantabria and País Vasco. In this 
latter Community, investment and employment per project acquire relevance. 
In any case, a clear trend exists to reduce the award rate over time. Thus, in contrast to 
an award rate of 26.3% of investment in 1988, the award rate gradually fell to 15% in 
1993 and 11.6% in 2001. This trend may be due to a gradual abandoning of this 
mechanism or to an increase in the number of applications accepted without the budget 
allocated to these objectives having increased in the same proportion. 
 
4. MUNICIPAL ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
It is clear that a municipal orientation underpins the definition and implementation of 
the Spanish Regional Investment Grant scheme. This is clearly reflected in the explicit 
mention made in Law 50/1985 and its Subsidiary Regulation of the aim of “distributing 
the economic activities in a more equitable way” over the various areas and 
“reinforcing the potential of endogenous development of the regions”. If, together with 
these considerations, the specific conditions laid down for those municipalities 
considered to be priority are taken into account, the municipal approach present both in 
the definition and application of the law is clearly evident. This inevitably leads to the 
growth of a region or eligible area being the reflection of the improvements made in the 
areas and municipalities that make up that region. It should also not be forgotten that 
agglomeration economies are an essential factor in explaining the business location 
decision and, therefore, an unquestionable element in any investment decision analysis. 
These circumstances justify on their own analysing the effects of incentive policy from 
the perspective of municipal economic development. With this aim in mind, the present 
section firstly approaches the description of the characteristics of the granted project 
based on the size of the municipality and subsequently makes a comparative analysis of 
the relationships between the incentives received by each municipality over the last few 
years and subsequent improvement in economic development. 
In order to evaluate the influence of agglomeration economies, municipalities have been 
divided into rural, medium size and urban. Within these rural municipalities, further 
divisions have been made into very small (below 1,000 inhabitants) and small   14
municipalities (between 1,000 and 10,000 inhabitants). Secondly, the medium size 
municipalities have been classified into those with a population between 10,000 and 
25,000 inhabitants and those with a population between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants. 
The third group comprises those municipalities which might be termed as urban, either 
as a result of having over 50,000 inhabitants or because they are provincial capitals, 
despite having a population of less than 50,000 inhabitants
10. In any case, the low 
number of medium size and urban municipalities, together with the existence of a high 
number of very small municipalities (table 8) might create some distortion in the 
analysis and its conclusions. 
Table 8. Number of municipalities under Law 50/1985 between 1988 and 2001 











Province  Total 
Total 3,806  1,988  291  67  35  43 6.,30  Number 
%  61.1  31.9 4.7 1.1 0.6 0.7  100.0 
Total 1,249,120  6,258,378  4,443,042  2,191,591 2,886,539 8,305,376 25.334.046  Population 
%  4.9 24.7 17.5  8.7 11.4 32.8  100.0 
Average population  328  3,148  15,268 32,710 82,473  193,148  4,066 
Source: own source. 
Table 9 reflects the obvious fact that incentives can only be granted where they have 
been previously requested, and these requests come from localities where companies are 
located, usually, in larger municipalities. Although, the data seems to show dynamism 
in rural municipalities (below 10,000 inhabitants) from where 40% of applications 
originate, this is due to the high number of rural municipalities (93% of the total of 
eligible localities), since less than a third of these have made an application for 
incentives at least once. In effect, when the number of requests is set alongside the 
municipality of origin, it is clear that the ratio increases dramatically as the size is 
greater. This behaviour is similar if subsidised projects are analysed, either in terms of 
eligible municipalities or granted municipalities (a municipality with at least one 
granted project). 
The greater number of requests and granted projects per 10,000 inhabitants in the 
smallest municipalities should not lead to the belief that there is greater dynamism in 
these. This is in fact generally due to the sparse population living in these small 
localities, and in those small ones receiving incentives, particularly to the high 
concentration of projects in a limited number of municipalities. Although dynamic 
                                            
10  There are five provincial capitals with less than 50,000 inhabitants with a granted project and 34 
granted municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants.   15
development is clearly evident in some small rural areas of less than 10,000 inhabitants 
(Juste, 2001), these are few and are located near to major road infrastructure points or 
are under the influence of an urban municipality. 
















province  Total 
Distribution of requests in terms of municipalities 6.4 35.6 23.3 9.4 8.7  16.6  100.0 
Percentage of denied requests (%)  29.6 28.6 29.4 29.5 34.1 36.7 30.7 
Percentage of failed projects (%)  26.3 25.4 23.1 22.8 20.6 19.5 23.3 
Requests per 10,000 inhabitants  7.4 8.2 7.6 6.2 4.4 2.9 5.7 
Projects executed per 10,000 inhabitants 3.3  3.8  3.6  3.0 2.0 1.3 2.6 
Projects executed per 10,000 inhabitants (only for 
granted municipality)  31.4 7.1 4.2 3.4 2.0 1.3 3.3 
Requests per eligible municipality    0.2  2.6 11.6 20.3 36.0 55.7  2.3 
Projects executed per eligible municipality  0.1 1.2 5.5 9.7  16.3  24.4 1.1 
Projects executed per granted municipality  1.5 2.8 6.5  11.2  17.3  24.4 4.4 
Distribution of final investment
1  (%)  2.8 30.6 24.6  9.3  9.4 23.3  100.0 
Distribution of final grant
1  (%)  2.6 26.8 24.8  8.7 10.7 26.4  100.0 
Distribution of final employment  (%)  3.3 30.7 20.9 11.4  7.8 25.9  100.0 
1 Mio € at 2001 prices. 
Source: own source. 
An attempt has been made to compensate the limited dynamic development of rural 
municipalities with a smaller percentage of rejected requests (28.7%) in comparison to 
larger municipalities. This greater initial flexibility has been subsequently translated 
into a greater percentage of failed initiatives (approved projects that for any reason are 
not executed, 35.8%). 
The concentration of requests and granted projects in rural municipalities is not 
accompanied by a similar concentration in investment, subsidy and employment (Table 
10). Considering the project size, measured either in terms of average investment or 
jobs created per project, a relevant aspect is growth as the municipality is larger. Thus, 
the investment carried out by provincial capital projects is on average three times that 
accomplished by the smaller rural municipal projects. 
The fact that the large municipalities as a whole have received a greater volume of 
subsidies than the small ones, despite having a lower number of requests and a smaller 
volume of investment, might lead to a belief in positive discrimination towards the 
former group
11. If the award rate is analysed, it can be seen that the small municipalities 
                                            
11   Nevertheless, the observation of what happened in each Autonomous Community forces us to make 
certain clarifications on this general appreciation. For example, in Andalucía, Asturias, Galicia and 
Murcia the large municipalities have percentages of accumulated subsidies higher than their   16
have been discriminated negatively in comparison to the larger ones. The latter receive 
a rate of award of 18.3% of investment, higher than the global average of 16.1%. 
Table 10. Characteristics of projects under Law 50/1985 between 1988 and 2001 
per size of municipality 











capital  Total 
Distribution of final investment
1  (%)  2.8 30.6 24.6  9.3  9.4 23.3  100.0 
Distribution of final grant
1  (%)  2.6 26.8 24.8  8.7 10.7 26.4  100.0 
Distribution of final employment  (%)  3.3 30.7 20.9 11.4  7.8 25.9  100.0 
Investment per project
2  1,835.0 4,169.2 3,508.4 3,880.8 4,462.0 6,005.9 4,077.4 
Investment per job
2  179.3 253.2 214.1 175.5 257.4 192.8 214.6 
Grant per job
2  27.7 41.2 30.2 26.5 47.2 35.3 34.7 
Employment per project  10.2 16.5 16.4 22.1 17.3 31.2 19.0 
Grant per project
2  283.1 678.8 494.7 586.5 818.3  1.100.3 658.5 
Rate of award (as a % of investment) 15.4 16.3 14.1 15.1 18.3 18.3 16.1 
1 at 2001 prices. 
2 Mio € at 2001 prices. 
Source: own source. 
This fact becomes even more relevant when it is seen that, on average, the investment 
required to create a job in a small municipality is noticeably smaller than is required in 
a large one. Hence, since urban municipalities prioritise intensive capital investments 
and that granted subsidies have been more closely linked to capital investment than to 
jobs created (or maintained), the grant received for each job created in the rural 
municipalities is smaller than in the urban areas. 
 
5. EFFECTS OF LAW 50 ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRANTED 
MUNICIPALITIES 
The characterisation of the granted projects based on the size of the municipality where 
they are located does not enable us to establish the existence (or absence) of a link 
between receiving support and the economic development of the municipality. The 
analysis of this relationship is a more complex task than in the case of regional 
economic development, due to the lack of an indicator to compare economic growth of 
a municipality over a period. 
As a consequence of the limited availability of homogenous statistical series at a local 
level, it has been necessary to create a Municipal Economic Index (MEI) as a proxy of 
the economic situation that allows a comparison between the economic performance of 
municipalities, enabling us to determine which of them has improved or worsened their 
                                                                                                                                
percentages of accumulated investment (Moyano and Ogando, 2003).   17
situation. This index makes it possible to relate this municipal development to the 
number, volume or characteristics of the incentives received under Law 50. 
The design of this index is limited due to the low number of existing statistics at a local 
scale that are homogeneous over the period of time considered in this research and 
which are able to provide adequate economic meaning. Taking into account these 
restrictions, the MEI has been calculated for two years, 1991 and 2001, and comprises 
five variables
12 that reflect the municipal economic situation reasonably well
13: 
•  Land telephone lines per 1,000 inhabitants: due to the correlation between 
telephone density and degree of development, this variable is highly indicative of 
municipal economic capacity. 
•  Bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants: the existence of banks, savings banks and 
cooperatives of credit branches is closely linked to municipal economic activity. 
•  Businesses per 1,000 inhabitants: the number of wholesale and retail sale 
premises can be considered a general economic activity indicator. In 1991, the 
data comes form the number of commercial licenses, whereas in 2001, it is 
replaced by the number of firms required to pay Business Tax (Impuesto de 
Actividades Económicas, IAE). 
•  The activity rate: the percentage  of the population aged 16 and above who 
supply, or are available to supply, labour for the production of goods and services. 
It tends to grow in line with economic development. 
•  The employment rate: the percentage of people of working age who have jobs. If 
a better economic situation is not accompanied by an increase in the employment 
rate (i.e, a reduction in the unemployment rate), this improvement will be hardly 
enjoyed by individuals and, therefore, will have little social impact. 
                                            
12   The statistical source that collects data on the number of telephone lines, bank branches and 
commercial activity was the Annual Spanish Trade Directory (Anuario Económico de España) that is 
periodically published by La Caixa Savings Bank. On the other hand, population, activity and 
employment rates have been calculated from the Population and Housing Census (Censo de 
Población y Vivienda) drawn up by the National Statistics Institute of Spain (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, INE). 
13  The methodology applied is similar to that used by the United Nations Development Program when 
drawing up the Human Development Index.   18
Despite the simplicity of these variables, data is only available for the 2,912 large 
municipalities (over 1,000 inhabitants). Only 2,188 of them were under Law 50 during 
the period considered. A priori, this circumstance seems very restrictive, although in 
truth, despite accounting for 61.1% of all eligible municipalities, it has a limited impact 
in terms of covered population, executed projects or amount of award, representing only 
5%, 6.2% and 2.6% of totals, respectively. 
Before the MEI is calculated, an index needs to be created for each of the five variables. 
To calculate these indices, minimum and maximum values (goalposts) are chosen for 
each variable. These goalposts are the maximum or minimum values for each variable, 
considering the 1991 and 2001 data. Thus, the performance of municipality “j” for 
variable “i” in year 1991 is expressed as a value between 0 and 100 by applying the 
following general formula:  
100 ·
) min , n Minimum(mi ) max , x Maximum(ma
















Finally, the MEI in year 1991 is calculated, as a simple average of the five previous 












Taking the MEI index in 1991 and 2001, there are several elements that can be analysed 
to detect and characterise the existence of a relationship between the municipal 
economic performance and the regional incentive policy. Thus, the following premises 
are studied: 
•  Firstly, the patterns of the MEI evolution between 1991-2001 depending whether 
it is an eligible municipality or has received a grant, taking into consideration the 
size of the municipality. 
•  Secondly, a possible relationship between the degree of improvement (or 
worsening) of the MEI and being a granted municipality of 1,000 inhabitants or 
more. 
•  Thirdly, a possible relationship between the degree of improvement (or 
worsening) of the MEI and being a granted municipality, but only among those   19
eligible (2,188 municipalities instead of 2,912). 
•  Fourthly, a possible relation between the change in the MEI of the 1,174 granted 
municipalities and the number of executed projects, the amount of award received 
or any other characteristic of the investment carried out. 
•  Finally, possible similarities among the behaviour pattern of granted 
municipalities under 10,000 inhabitants grouped by Autonomous Communities. 
In order to answer the first question, table 11 shows the MEI growth rate for each type 
of municipality, classified by size. The data reveals that, in general, the eligible 
municipalities have improved their situation below the average. Nevertheless, the 
eligible municipalities without granted projects have improved above the average. In the 
small and medium eligible municipalities (up to 50,000 inhabitants), those that finally 
have received some aid have grown to a greater extent than those that were not 
subsidised. In the urban municipalities (over 50,000 inhabitants) the previous statement 
is reversed, and in fact the average growth of the subsidised municipalities tends to 
diminish as their size increases. 
Table 11. MEI average changes per type of municipalities over 1,000 inhabitants 
Granted municipality  Size of Municipality  Eligible 
municipality 
Number of 
municipalities  Yes No  Total 
Yes   1,751  12.1%  11.0%  11.7% 
No 566 -  5.6%  5.6%  Less than 10,000 inhabitants 
Total 2,317  12.1%  9.5%  10.6% 
Yes 359  11.2%  10.7%  11.1% 
No 121 -  6.2%  6.2% 
Between 10,000 and 50,000 
inhabitants 
Total 480  11.2%  7.6%  9.9% 
Yes 35  9.9%  10.7%  10.0% 
No 28  -  9.4%  9.4%  Over 50,000 inhabitants 
Total 63  9.9%  9.5%  9.6% 
Yes 43  6.8%  -  6.8% 
No 9  -  4.3%  4.3%  Provincial capitals 
Total 52  6.8%  4.3%  5.5% 
Yes 2,188  9.3%  11.0%  9.5% 
No 724 -  6.0%  6.0%  All municipalities  
Total 2,912  9.3%  7.1%  8.2% 
Source: own source. 
This first approach leads to the second hypothesis, a possible relationship between the 
degree of improvement (or worsening) of the MEI and being a granted municipality. 
Table 12 synthesises some contingency tables that answer this question. Taking the 
average MEI improvement at a national level (8.2%) as a reference, whether a greater or   20
smaller MEI change is related to obtaining incentives has been analysed using the 
Goodman and Kruskal Tau Coefficient and through the Uncertainty Coefficient
14. 
The calculated significance levels of the contingency tables are below 0.05, except for 
provincial capitals, reflecting the existence of a relation between both aspects. 
However, the proximity of both coefficients to zero means that this relation is positive 
but very small. 
Table 12. MEI trends compared with the national average for municipalities over 
1,000 inhabitants 
Granted 
municipality  Size of 
municipality 










Negative   70  230 
Positive but under the average  214  449 
Less than 10,000 
inhabitants 





Negative   20  25 
Positive but under the average  91  71 
Between 10,000 
and 50,000 





Negative   0  0 
Positive but under the average  17  6 
More than 50,000 
inhabitants 





Negative   1  1 
Positive but under the average  21  6  Provincial capitals 





1 The figure in brackets is the critical significance level. If it is below 0.05 the null hypothesis of 
independence can be rejected and, therefore, a relationship among the involved variables can be 
accepted. 
Source: own source. 
Thirdly, and in an attempt to make the set of municipalities considered more 
homogeneous, a possible relationship between the degree of improvement (or 
worsening) of the MEI and being a granted municipality has been analysed, although 
only among those that are eligible. Therefore, the MEI has been recalculated for 1991 
and 2001 taking the maximum and minimum values of the five variables for the 2,188 
eligible municipalities, instead of the 2,912 municipalities with 1,000 inhabitants or 
more.  
Table 13 reflects the association measures that, as in the previous case, have values very 
close to 0, but now accompanied by higher significance levels (above 0.05). This is why 
the hypothesis of independence between both variables can be accepted (i.e. there is no 
                                            
14  Both the Goodman and Kruskal Tau Association Measurement and the Uncertainty Coefficient vary 
between 0 and 1. The closer to 1 the stronger the relationship between variables. 
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evident relationship between the improvement of the MEI and execution of granted 
projects). 
Table 13. MEI trends compared with the national average for eligible 
municipalities 
Granted municipality Size of 
municipality 
MEI change between 1991 and 








Negative   70  125 
Positive but under the average  274  295 
Less than 10,000 
inhabitants 





Negative   21  1 
Positive but under the average  119  28 
Between 10,000 
and 50,000 





Negative   0  0 
Positive but under the average  18  0 
More than 50,000 
inhabitants 





Negative   1  - 




Positive and over the average  11  - 
- - 
1 The figure in brackets is the critical significance level. If it is below 0.05 the null hypothesis of 
independence can be rejected and, therefore, a relationship among the involved variables can be 
accepted. 
2 It is not possible to calculate the coefficients for provincial capitals since all the potentially eligible 
capitals have enjoyed some subsidised project. 
Source: own source. 
Fourthly, after testing the lack of relationship between the municipal economic 
performance and the condition of being a granted municipality, the progress of the 
1,174 granted municipalities is assessed. Thus, we were interested in knowing whether 
there was a possible relationship between the MEI change of these municipalities and 
the number of executed projects, the amount of award received or any other 
characteristic of the investment. As the MEI changes and all the considered 
characteristics are numerical variables, the Spearman Correlation Coefficient (ρ) and 
Kendall’s Tau-b Coefficient are applied
15. 
Overall, the data in table 14 reflect that a clear relationship between the improvement of 
the municipal situation and the number, the amount of award and the characteristics of 
the granted projects does not exist. Only in the large municipalities and, specially, in the 
countryside, is it possible to establish a correlation (significance below 0.05). 
Nevertheless, due to the low value of both coefficients and their negative sign, it is a 
very small and inverse relationship.  
                                            
15   Both coefficients of correlation enable us to establish the existence of a linear relation between 
ordinal variables when normality cannot be assumed in the considered variable. They vary between -1 
and 1, being positive if it is a direct relationship and negative if it is an inverse one. 
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In the case of municipalities of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, the improvement in the 
municipal situation tends to be smaller as the total amount of award or the grant per 
project increases. Similar behaviour can be seen in the total investment carried out, the 
average investment per project, the total employment created by municipality or the 
average employment per project. 
In the municipalities over 50,000 inhabitants that are not provincial capitals, the inverse 
relation between municipal improvement and the subsidy or employment per project is 
quite strong. 
Table 14. Correlation Coefficients between the MEI change and the characteristics 
of the obtained grant by municipal size 
Less than 
10,000 inhabitants 
Between 10,000 and 
50,000 inhabitants 
More than 50,000 
inhabitants 
Provincial capitals 
  Explaining factors 
Rho (ρ)  Tau-b  Rho (ρ)  Tau-b  Rho (ρ)  Tau-b  Rho (ρ)  Tau-b 
















Number of granted projects 



















































































































































































Source: own source. 
Finally, another interesting point, related to the previous one, is analysing to what 
extent the previous relationships follow similar patterns of behaviour if municipalities 
are grouped by Autonomous Communities, as the regional governments have some 
influence in the design of the regional inventive policy. In this case, the analysis is 
limited to 794 municipalities of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants since the other types of 
municipalities have a very small number of observations. The Spearman correlation 
coefficient (ρ) is used to find these relationships. 
Table 15 reveals that there is no relationship between the application of Law 50 and the 
economic improvement of the rural municipalities in six Autonomous Communities   23
(Andalucía, Comunidad Valenciana, Aragón, Cantabria and País Vasco), as the MEI 
changes do not have not any significant link with any of the twelve variables under 
consideration. Only Murcia presents a positive and intense correlation between MEI 
change and five defining variables of its projects, although the small number of 
municipalities in this region forces us to approach this finding with caution. The 
development of small municipalities in Castilla y León and Galicia is linked only to a 
limited extent to the number of projects per 1,000 inhabitants and with the total number 
of projects carried out, respectively. 
Table 15. Spearman Correlation Coefficient between the MEI change and the 















































































































































Number of granted 
municipalities  174  116  100  98 90 68 40 27 28 20 16 16 














































































































































































































































































































Source: own source. 
On the other hand, the small municipalities of Canarias show inverse relationships 
between the MEI change for six variables and one with a direct relationship. Similarly, 
three regions (Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura and Asturias) present some relevant 
relationships (6, 1 and 2 significant relationships, respectively), although all of them are 
inverse, which is difficult to explain in clear economic terms.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding analysis enables us to show that there is no clear relationship between 
improvement in the municipal economic performance and the possibility of benefiting 
from or having benefited from regional incentive policy. There is no significant 
relationship between municipal economic improvement and the number, amount of 
award or characteristics of the granted projects. It has even been confirmed in rural 
areas that the improvement in municipal performance tends to be smaller as the total 
amount of incentives or the rate of award per project increases. 
The reasons behind this perceived lack of effectiveness are firstly linked to elements 
related to the design of the Law and, secondly, to aspects of its implementation and 
execution. Some of these circumstances have already been highlighted by the Court of 
Auditors. With regard to design, the following aspects can be mentioned: 
•  The continuous modifications throughout the 1990s of the eligible areas in terms of 
their configurations and their rates of award. The wide range of maximum rates of 
award, typology of assisted areas and types of areas, as well as their subsequent 
alterations, together with the possible exceptions, has led to a high degree of 
confusion and complexity in the implementation of the Law.  
•  The existence of different areas with circumstances, problems and, mainly, with 
different potentialities for endogenous development, has been reflected in the 
establishment of different objectives to be achieved. Nevertheless, the disparity of 
objectives has not been taken into consideration either in eligible area delimitation 
or in the characteristics of the eligible activities, projects types and expenditures in 
each of them. 
•  Incentives have been awarded to municipalities that already had industrial activity, 
instead of concentrating efforts on the location of firms in municipalities without 
any industrial activity (a project can be granted if a firm requests it). For that 
reason, the granted municipalities were those that already had companies located in 
their area. The less dynamic profile of the rural municipalities in the request for 
incentives is accompanied by a smaller percentage of rejected requests. 
Nevertheless, if this has been a deliberate attempt to compensate this deficiency on 
the part of those responsible for final concession, the strategy has not had the 
desired effect. In fact, the smaller percentage of applications rejected for rural   25
municipalities has been translated into a greater percentage of failed projects. 
Inversely, the percentage of rejected applications is greater in the large 
municipalities and provincial capitals than in the countryside and the percentage of 
failed projects is noticeably smaller. 
•  The high number of approved projects that have not been carried out can partly be 
explained by the imbalance between the characteristics of eligible projects and the 
specifics of companies with weak competitive profiles (in theory, the object of this 
incentive scheme) of the eligible municipalities. These characteristics are in fact 
more in line with the kind of investment made by large scale productive units. In 
addition, the latter are more able to deal effectively with the complex 
administrative machinery required to apply for a subsidy. 
The analysis of the execution of Law 50/1985 has highlighted the following 
circumstances that may in part explain its lack of effectiveness: 
•  Although a common profile for all the projects cannot be established, with clear 
differences between zones and Autonomous Communities, some general 
conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, the size of the projects clearly increases as the 
population is larger. Secondly, investment associated to provincial capital projects 
is on average three times larger than the investment of the smaller rural projects. 
Thirdly, the investment necessary to create a job in the small municipalities is 
smaller than is required in the large ones. One possible explanation is that the 
grants have been more connected with investment than the creation or maintenance 
of employment and in urban municipalities capital-intensive investments are more 
important. Therefore, the subsidy received per job created in rural municipalities 
has been smaller than the grant received in urban areas. A possible reason behind 
these facts is the role played by agglomeration economies. 
•  In global terms, large municipalities have received a more substantial grant than the 
small ones, despite having a smaller number of applications and lower investment. 
The fact that smaller size municipalities have enjoyed a below average rate of 
award raises the possibility of negative discrimination with regard to larger 
municipalities. 
By way of a conclusion, the preceding results lead us to think that the effectiveness of 
regional incentive grants analysed has to date proved more than questionable.   26
Reorientation is therefore necessary to adapt this instrument to the new model of society 
centred on a knowledge-based economy. This modification is particularly essential 
under the premise that dynamic rural areas and micro-firms are key factors in sustaining 
local economies, at a time when the goal of maintaining the rural population is at the 
top of the political agenda. An integrated approach therefore needs to be adopted to 
align and co-ordinate different policies (regional promotion, employment, agriculture...) 
while at the same time pursuing improvement of the existing administration 
mechanisms. This change of direction must go hand in hand with a redefinition of 
eligible activities and expenditures, leaving aside traditional activities and focusing 
incentives on those that create more added value. 
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